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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER LEE CHAMBLEE, 
by and through his 
guardian ad Litem, 
Gertrude Elkins, 
Plaintiff an.d .Appellant, 
-vs.-
JOHN STOCKS and 
RAY TIBBETTS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 8666 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in plaintiff's brief 
are stated from the plaintiff's standpoint entirely. The 
defendant's version of the facts and the testimony sub-
mitted by witnesses called by the defense show that the 
plaintiff was picked up for questioning by the Sheriff 
and Ray Tibbetts, Deputy Sheriff, on April 27, 1955, at 
the Pick Service Station at Moab at between 7:00 
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o 'clock and 7 :30 in the evening ( Tr. 145, 24 7). Prior to 
this time the Sheriff and Deputy Tibbetts had been to 
Price to an F. B. I. School. They were through with 
the School at around 4 :30 and left Price and came back 
to Moab in the Sheriff's car (Tr. 145, 245). They 
arrived in Moab just about dark. Prior to leaving Price 
Sheriff Stocks had received a telephone call from Sher-
iff Snyder of Vernal asking him to locate John Edwin 
Davis, who was _also sometimes referred to in the tes, 
timony as Edwin John Davis (Tr. 145, 245). Sheriff 
Snyder instructed Sheriff Stocks to pick up Davis and 
place him in the Grand County jail and then call him 
collect when he had him in custody. 
Both the Sheriff and Deputy Tibbetts talked to the 
plaintiff in the Sheriff's automobile for 10 or 15 minutes 
and asked him about a geiger counted that had been re-
cently stolen and about passing marijuana cigarettes 
which the plaintiff denied (Tr. 146, 149, 150, 249, 250). 
Stocks and Tibbetts, then, without using any force or vio-
lence or threats in any manner, released the plaintiff from 
the car ( Tr. 151, 250). They then went oYer to the Colo-
rado River looking for John Edwin Davis for the Sheriff 
of Uintah County (Tr. 251). They droYe up the River 
Road to Nigger Bill Canyon, turned around and came 
back to the bridge and drove up the other side of the River 
and located Davis on the North side of said River (Tr. 
154, 253). Davis was picked up about 8:00 to 8:30p.m. 
and was then taken to the Grand County jail in l\Ioab 
where Sheriff Stocks placed a collect call to Sheriff 
Snyder at Vernal to inform him that he had Davis in 
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custody (Tr . .157, 254). They waited from 30 minutes to 
an hour to get this call through to Snyder but were 
un$uccessful in contacting him (Tr. 1~7, 254). Later on in 
the evening around midnight Police Officer Leach in-
formed Sheriff Stocks that there was a call for him from 
Sheriff Snyder at Vernal ( Tr. 106, 163, 210). Sheriff 
Stocks and Deputy Tibbetts returned to the office where 
the call was taken from Sheriff Snyder at Vernal, and 
the Uintah County Sheriff was advised that Davis had 
been taken into custody and arrangements were made 
for Davis to be held in Moab until the following day 
'vhen Sheriff Snyder would come for him. After waiting 
30 minutes to an hour for this telephone call to Sheriff 
Snyder, the Sheriff and Deputy Tibbetts then went to 
the downtown area of Moab on patrol duty (Tr. 158, 255). 
They talked to Reed Somerville in front of the 66 Club 
( Tr. 158, 263, 341). While talking to Reed Somerville a 
Theodore Gibson drove up the street with some loud 
pipes on his car. Tibbetts remarked that this was the 
hotrod that they had been trying to catch (Tr. 159, 264). 
Tibbetts and the Sheriff then left in the Sheriff's car and 
overtook Theodore Gibson in his hotrod and Tibbetts 
gave him a ticket for excessive noise (Tr. 160, 161, 264, 
265, 266, 320). 
Warren Kent Somerville, who is the son of Reed 
Somerville, was called as a witness and he testified that 
he was in the car with Theodore Gibson and that they 
'vere stopped by the Sheriff and Deputy and that Tibbetts 
gave Gibson a ticket for excessive noise ( Tr. 320). War-
ren Kent Somerville testified that Gibson got thic ticket 
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between 8 and 10:00 p.m. (Tr. 320). He further testified 
that thereafter they were driving up and down the streets 
in Moab and they saw the Sheriff and Tibbetts a couple of 
times again that evening before midnight (Tr. 321, 324). 
At the time Gibson was given a ticket the Sheriff removed 
a half case of beer from the car ( Tr. 160, 265, 319). Reed 
Somerville was the probation officer and the testimony 
shows that Warren Kent Somerville, the son, and Reed, 
the father, had a very firm discussion about this beer 
being in the car, which makes this occasion o~ being 
stopped by the Sheriff and Deputy very vivid in the mem-
ory of Warren Kent Somerville (Tr. 320, 339). 
Bert Dalton, Justice of the Peace, was called as a 
witness and he testified that on April 29, Deputy Tibbetts 
appeared before him and made complaint against Theo-
dore Gibson for committing the crime of excessive noise 
on April 27, 1955. A photostat of the Justice of the 
Peace's Docket was received in evidence as Exhibit 9 
(Tr. 331). 
Kay Young was called as a witness. He testified that 
he was in the downtown area of Moab on April 27 in the 
evening, that he saw the Sheriff's ca.r twice, once at the 
Standard Oil Bulk Plant, and the second time on l\fain 
Street. That he saw them there after 8:00 p.m. 
(Tr. 225, 226). 
Danny Bittle testified that on April 27 he "rent to 
the show at Moab and 'vas downtown around 9 :00 to 9:30 
in the evening, that he saw the Sheriff and Deputy Tib-
betts at the intersection of Fern's Cafe on Main Street, 
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that he talked to them at around 10 :00 to 10 :30 p.m. and 
he saw .them again at the Arches Cafe after 11 :00 p.m. 
(Tr. 232, 233). 
In the contrast to this the plaintiff, Walter Lee 
Chamblee, testified that he was taken into custody by 
Sheriff Stocks and Deputy Tibbetts between 7 :00 and 
7 :30 that evening ( Tr. 67), that they took him over to 
some butane tanks where he claimed that they beat him 
up; that around 8 :20 to 8:30 they took him up the .Colo-
rado River to Nigger Bill Canyon (Tr. 78), that they 
'vere with him continuously until 5 or 10 minutes after 
12 o'clock midnight (Tr. 79), and that he was with them 
continuously between 41/2 and 5 ·hours that evening from 
about 7:00 p.m. until about 12:10 a.m. (Tr. 79). 
Chamblee also testified that after the Sheriff and 
Deputy left him at 5 or 10 minutes after midnight in 
Nigger Bill Canyon,. after he had been hit and beaten, 
that he was unable to walk, that he crawled about 75 feet 
down to the creek, and that as he went do,vn the River 
Road he would walk and run and crawl (Tr. 28, 82, ·83); 
that he crawled on his hands and knees 4 or 5 times. He 
further testified that the waist overalls he had on while 
he was doing all this crawling 'vere the same ones that 
were introduced as evidence in Court (Tr. 22, 83), which 
clothing was made available for examination by the jury 
to determine whether, in their opinion, Chamblee did 
crawl through the creek bed and do,vn the River Road as 
he had testified. 
There 'vas a direct conflict in much of the evidence 
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and the jury was called upon to determine who was telling 
the truth. The jury heard evidence from the Sheriff and 
his Deputy and several witnesses called by the defense 
that ~he Sheriff and Deputy were in the downtown Moab 
area performing their duties as officers during the time 
that Chamblee claimed they had him in Nigger Bill Can-
yon hitting and abusing him. The jury, after hearing the 
evidence, apparently believed the testimony of the de-
fense witnesses and returned a verdict of no cause 
of action. 
Doctor Winston S. Ekren attended Chamblee at the 
Moab hospital. He stated that in his examination he saw 
some red marks on Chamblee's chest and back (Tr. 38, 
53), but did not recall seeing any marks on his face (Tr. 
40, 54) . He further stated that he noticed no bleeding 
at the mouth or the nose (Tr. 49), and observed no loose 
hair or bald spots where the hair had been pulled out as 
claimed by Chamblee (Tr. 54). There were no bruises or 
marks observed by the doctor on his legs or in the groin 
area (Tr. 55). The doctor stated his opinion that Cham-
blee was complaining more than was justified from his 
examination (Tr. 55). X-ray was made of the chest area 
which revealed no bone injury (Tr. 56). The bruise 
marks on the chest were described by the doctor as being 
mildly red, and that they never did change color into 
black and blue marks (Tr. 54); he further stated that he 
did not observe any cuts or lacerations on Chamblee (Tr. 
53). The doctor's physical examination of Chamblee did 
not bear out the claim of plaintiff that he had been hit and 
beaten to the extent and in the manner that he testified. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Plaintiff claims as Point No. 1 that "the trial Court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant a change of 
venue on plaintiff's motion." The record shows that on 
May 25, 1956, plaintiff ~led· a motion for change of place 
of .trial, and in support thereof, attached the following 
Affidavit of Robert W. Hughes, attorney for plaintiff: 
Comes now Robert W. Hughes, attorney for plain-
tiff, in the above entitled cause, who first being 
duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says : 
That he is well acquainted with the defendant, 
John Stocks, in the above entitled matter, and he 
is well acquainted with many of the residents in 
Moab City and Grand County; that said John 
Stocks is an elected public official of Grand County, 
to wit: Sheriff; that said John Stocks is a member 
of one of the oldest families in Moab and Grand 
County; that his relatives are numerous and his 
relatives, acquaintances and friends are innumer-
able in Grand County. Therefore, it would be 
almost impossible to procure an impartial jury for 
the trial of this matter and that deponent believes 
that an impartial trial cannot be had in the afore-
said County designated in plaintiff's Complaint, 
and that the place of trial for this action should 
be transferred to Carbon County, Price, Utah, 
"\Vherein the relatives and friends of said John 
Stocks are not so numerable. 
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1956. 
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The hearing on said motion was held on June 18, 1956, 
and the proceedings thereof are reported in the trial 
transcript of testimony commencing at page 356. Dis-
cussion was had as to possible difficulty in getting a jury 
(Tr. 359), whereupon the Court denied the motion and 
stated "If we can't get a jury, then we will consider 
whether we should move the trial for another place of 
trial or not'' ( Tr. 361). The motion for change of place 
of trial was again renewed by plaintiff in chambers on 
the day the trial began following the choosing of a panel 
of 14 prospective jurors. The hearing on said motion is 
reported commencing at page 6 of the transcript of tes-
timony. The grounds presented "\vere that the prospec ... 
tive jurors all knew and were acquainted with the 
defendants ( Tr. 6), that all of the prospective jurors had 
heard about the case (Tr. 8), and that the case involved 
public officials (Tr. 9). After discussion, the Court stated 
that it was impressed that remarkable success ha.d been 
had in getting 14 open-minded men and women as jurors 
(Tr. 10), and denied the motion. 
The plaintiff claims reversable error on the ground 
that the Court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
for change of venue. Section 78-13-9 U.C.A., 1953, speci-
fies the grounds upon which the Court may change the 
place of trial. It is noted that the language used in said 
statute is discretionary. It reads as follows: 
''The Court may, on motion, change the place of 
trial in the following eases : 
• 
(2) When there is reason to believe that an 
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impartial trial cannot be had in the county, 
city or precint designated in the complaint.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
In construing the meaning of said statute, the Utah Court, 
in Anderson vs. Johnson, 1 U. 2d 400, 268 P. 2d 427, at 
page 404, stated: 
''Our statute is so worded that it necessarily is left 
to the option of the trial court in all cases involving 
prejudice of the people locally, to decide whether 
conditions are such that the requirement of jus-
tice "\vould be best subserved by a change. 
''There would seem to be no room for contest 
where the statute makes the allowance of a change 
discretionary with the court. 
''A trial court's ruling on such a rna tter will not 
be considered to have been an abuse of discretion 
unless the court acted unfairly or by whim or 
caprice or practically denied justice in the case.'' 
The question of local bias is largely one of fact and is, 
therefore, peculiarly within the province of the trial 
judge. The record in the instant case clearly shows that 
the court gave due consideration to the grounds raised 
by the plaintiff. In ruling upon the original motion the 
Court recognized that the controlling factor in deter-
mining whether a change in the place of trial should be 
made would be the ability or inability to obtain an im-
parital jury at the time of trial ( Tr. 361). The Court 
joined in the interrogation of the prospective jurors as 
to their acquaintance with the defendants, whether or 
not their acquaintance with the defendants would in-
fluence them one way or another in rendering a fair and 
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impartial verdict based upon the evidence and the law 
in the case, whether they had heard about the case, or 
discussed the case with the defendants, and if they had 
formed any opinion concerning the merits of . the case 
from .what they had heard (Tr. 3, 45). Juryman Ellis 
testified, as stated in plaintiff's brief, that it might 
embarrass him to render a judgment against the Sheriff, 
but in answer to further questioning by the Court, he 
stated that he would be willing to follow the direction of 
the Court and decided the case on the evidence irrespec-
tive of his long acquaintance with the Sheriff {Tr. 4). 
Having had opportunity to observe the jurors first hand, 
the Court concluded that the claim of the plaintiff that 
a fair and impartial trial could not be had was unfounded, 
as witness his statement "Well it seems 've have had re-
markable success in getting 14 men and 'vomen there 
that are as open-minded as they are in this type of a 
case in this vicinity" (Tr. 10). On the basis of the record 
it cannot be said that the Court, in denying plaintiff's 
motion, ''acted unfairly or by whim or caprice, or prac-
tically denied justice in the case.'' 
Traditionally, the law respects the right of a de-
fendant to defend an action against himself within the 
County of his residence, unless other factors are of 
sufficient weight as to justify the place of trial to be 
moved. The fact that one litigant is "~idely known in 
the County of residence ",.hereas another is relatively 
unknown assuredly is not such a circumstanee as dictates 
a ruling that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had. 
That mere acquaintance or popularity is not sufficient 
10 
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grounds to require a change of venue, see Krehbiel v. 
Goering, 293 P. 2d 255, a 1956 Kansas case, in which it was 
held that refusal to change the place of trial on defend-
ant's allegation that plaintiff was a resident of the County 
and defendants non-residents, and plaintiff was person-
ally acquainted with a large number of persons qualified 
to serve as jurors so that defendants could not have a 
fair and impartial trial, was not an abuse of discretion. 
The California Court, in J. I. Case Threshing Ma-
chine Company v. Copren Bros., et al. 169 Pac. 443, was 
called upon to rule upon a similar question in a case hav-
ing almost analogous facts to the case at bar. The affidavit 
in support for a motion for change of venue provided, 
inter alia, as follows : 
" ... that the said plaintiff is practically un-
acquainted in the said County; that the said de-
fendants . . . were born and raised in the said 
county, and are well and favorably known 
throughout its entire length; that they lived there 
nearly, if not entirely, the whole of their lives, and 
are at this time, mature men; that the County is a 
sparsely settled County, and the acquaintanceship 
of the said defendants extends throughout its 
course and length; that one of the said defendants 
.... has, for a number of years, occupied the posi-
tion of county assessor of said County, and is of 
wide and consequential influence therein.'' 
It further appeared that the population of said county 
was approximately 5,000. Although a much stronger case 
for change was there made than in the instant case, the 
Court denied the motion for change of venue and at page 
447 stated as follows: 
11 
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'' lt is conceivable that a showing might be made 
of a prejudice against a plaintiff so widespread, 
intense and outspoken through the public press 
and otherwise as to warrant a conclusion that the 
plaintiff would not have a fair trial where the 
action was pending. But it must be conceded that, 
without making an attempt to secure an impar-
tial jury, it would require something more than a 
showing that the defendants are well and favor-
ably known throughout the entire length of the 
county, and that one of them is of wide and conse-
quential influence therein because he had been en-
trusted with the offioo of county assessor. 
The Court also stated at page 446: 
''It is an unwarranted inference that an impartial 
jury cannot be called from the citizens of that 
county capable of impartially trying a case be-
tween a foreign corporation and residents therein 
simply because these persons are widely and fav-
orably known in the county.'' 
In Reyher, et al., v. Mayne, 10 P. 2d, 1109, the Colo-
rado Court, in 1932, was called upon to determine whether 
or not the trial Court had abused its discretion in deny-
ing a motion for change of venue made by the defendants 
in a civil case wherein plaintiff was Sheriff of the County 
in which suit was brought. The Court states at page 1110 
as follows: 
''The a pplica.tion for change of place of trial was 
based on the alleged bias of the people of the 
county of the venue of which plaintiff "~as Sheriff, 
making it impossible, so it 'vas said, to secure an 
impartial jury .... We haYe repeatedly held that 
in the absence of abuse of discretion the trial 
12 
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Court's determination of the question is control-
ling on review .... The application is novel only in 
that plaintiff was Sheriff of the County where 
the cause of action arose and where he was seeking 
judicial redress. Such fact, while necessarily 
challenging the Court's best consideration and 
solemn judgment, constituted only an element and 
does not authorize a change as a. matter of right. 
Examination of the record indicates the Court 
sensed the gravity of the point and that in making 
determination there was no abuse of discretion.'' 
} 
Plaintiff emphasizes in his brief the contact which a 
sheriff has with persons called to serve as jurors. Plain-
tiff does not claim, however, any particular acts on the 
part of the defendants whereby plaintiff was prejudiced 
other than in the general allegation that the jurors were 
acquainted with the Sheriff. Nothing specific is claimed 
whereby defendants used their offices to the damage of 
plaintiff. It should be pointed out that the contact which 
a Sheriff has with those chosen to serve as jurors is min-
isterial only. In the absence of a shortage of jurors the 
Sheriff has nothing whatsoever to do with the determi-
nation of who is to be chosen to act in this capacity. It 
is submitted that presenting the persons drawn for jury 
duty with notice of their selection and attending the jury 
while in Court are not such contacts as necessarily endear 
the Sheriff to the hearts of those so called. 
The cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of his 
claim that the Trial Court abused its discretion in deny-
ing the motion for change of venue are all distinguish-
able on their facts from the instant case. In Hunter v. 
Beckley, 129 W.Va.. 302,40 SW 2d 332, wherein the plain-
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tiff was clerk of the circuit court-''by reason of the very 
close and intimate connection· which ·a circuit clerk neces-
sarily has in the selection of juries'' (Pg. 336). In Belden 
v. Thiel, 211 Wis. 428, 248 NW 417, the trial Court denied 
a motion for change of venue in an actio~ in which the 
circuit judge was the plaintiff and the case was tried 
before a jury, the members of which had served as jurors 
during the term of court at which the judge's case was 
fried. The appellate Court ordered a new trial and a 
change of venue because of the prestige of the office of a 
circuit judge and the additional fact that the case was 
tried by a jury who had been iin attendance at the court 
of said judge as jurors during the entire term at which 
said case tried, and thereby had .. had a close associa-
tion with the judge in the work of the court. State ex rel., 
White Water Association of Primitive Baptists '· H oel-
scher, Judge, 208 Ind. 334, 196 NE 1, stands for the prop-
osition that transfer should be ordered because of bias of 
the trial judge and not because of any apparent bias or 
prejudice in the community. The question to be decided 
in Tucker v. Gorley, 176 Miss. 708, 170 So. 230, cited in 
plaintiff's brief, was not whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to justify the court granting a change of -venue, but 
rather whether the court had po,ver to change the place 
of trial at all under the particular statutes applic-able in 
the State of Mississippi. 
It is submitted that the denial by the Trial Court of 
plaintiff's motion for a change of venue in the instant 
case :was not an abuse of discretion, and plaintiff~s Point 
No. I is without merit. 
14 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiff contends that ''the Trial Court a bused its 
discretion in refusing to grant plaintiff's motion for new 
trial on the ground of surprise through variance in the 
deposition and testimony at the trial of the defendant, 
John Stocks.'' The claim is based upon the fact that in 
his deposition Sheriff John Stocks in answer to several 
questions as to what he did and who he saw during the 
evening of April 27, 1955, replied that he did not know 
or he did not remember, whereas at the time of trial said 
defendant gave testimony, supported by other witnesses, 
as to his activities during the evening in question. It is 
contended that such testimony surprised the plaintiff 
and prevented plaintiff from having a fair trial and the 
Trial Court in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
on this ground thereby abused its discretion. 
The position of the Utah Supreme Court is clear as 
to review by it of decisions of the trial court upon motions 
for a new trial. In Moser v. Zion's Co-Op Merca;ntile Inst., 
197 P. 2d 136, the Court stated at page 139 as follows : 
''It is a matter now too well settled to admit of any 
serious dispute ... that the question of granting or 
denying a motion for a new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial Court. . . . This 
Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of 
the trial Court. . . . We do not ordinarily inter-
fere with rulings of the trial Court in either grant-
ing or denying a motion for new trial and unless 
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abuse of, or failure to exercise discretion on the 
part of the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the 
ruling of the trial judge will be sustained.'' 
The rule was further stated in a more recent case Mar-
shall v. Ogden Union Ry. arnd Depot Co., 221 P. 2d 868, as 
follows: 
''The granting or denying of a motion for a new 
trial is within . the sound discretion of the trial 
Court. When a trial Court grants a new trial we 
will· not disturb its action unless it is manifestly 
apparent that the Court has abused its discretion . 
. . . The Court has a great latitude in determining 
whether or not to grant such a motion and regard-
less of whehter ·or not it refuses or grants the 
motion this. Court will not disturb its discretion if 
such decision has a reasonable basis.'' 
A comparison of the deposition of defendant John 
Stocks and his testimony at the trial does not show that 
said defendant stated at one time he ,,~ould testify to a 
certain state of facts and then at the trial changed his 
statements and stated the facts to be different or to the 
contrary. While it is true that the Sheriff replied to sev-
eral questions at the time his deposition was taken that he 
did not recall or did not remember, such is understandable 
when it is realized that the deposition 'vas taken more 
than a year following the date upon "~hich plaintiff claims 
the assault occurred. It is understandable that Sheriff 
Stocks would not have a detailed recollection of what 
transpired on a day that long ago. Sheriff Stocks did not 
know beforehand what questions he would be asked at the 
deposition. He had no particular reason or incentive to 
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undertake measures to refresh his memory as to what 
happened on said day prior to the time his deposition 
was taken. In answering that he did not know or did 
not recall, said defendant was simply telling the truth. 
Thereafter, however, faced with a claim against him 
which he knew to be false, the Sheriff very naturally did 
all things possible to bring to mind events which hap.-
pened on the day in question. He checked the material at 
his disposal and talked to other people, all of which helped 
to refresh his memory and enabled him to testify as was 
done at the trial (Tr. 211-214). 
A review of the entire deposition of the defendant, 
John Stocks, indicates a ge·nuine effort on his part to 
answer to the best of his recollection and does not show his 
answers to be deliberately evasive as claimed by the plain-
tiff in the isolated examples as shown in plaintiff's brief. 
Any claimed variance in the things Sheriff Stocks stated 
in his deposition and in his testimony at the trial would 
go to the weight of his testimony to be considered by the 
jury in determining whether or not he was telling the 
truth. The jury was given this opportunity and chose to 
believe the defense. 
Plaintiff contends as one basis for his surprise that 
the defendant Stocks said nothing in his deposition as to 
the time of arrest of Edwin John Davis but at the trial he 
testified that said arrest was made during the actual 
time when plaintiff claimed he was in the custody of the 
defendants. The deposition of John Stocks reveals at 
page 46 that the entry for April 27, 1955, in the arrest 
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book of the Sheriff was read at the deposition arid the 
following app.eared therein: 
"Edwin John Davis. Held for Herb Snyder, Sher-
iff, Vernal, Utah." 
The· time of day ·of said arrest did not appear in said 
entry but plaintiff was put on notice at the taking of the 
deposition that a man by the name of Edwin John Davis 
was· arrested on said date and held for Herb Snyder, 
Sheriff at Vernal, Utah, and assuredly plaintiff cannot 
now complain that he had no opportunity to check or 
verify the details of said arrest, when it occurred, and 
matters connected therewith, such as long distance tele-
phone calls between Sheriff Stocks and Sheriff Snyder. 
It is further pointed out that plaintiff's attorney did not 
even ask Sheriff Stocks in the deposition as to the time of 
day or night that Davis was arrested (Deposition of 
John Stocks, 46) . 
. Although plaintiff has claimed surprise in the alleged 
variance of the testimony of John Stocks at the time his 
deposition was taken and at the time of trial to be a 
ground for new trial, the record of said trial is completely 
silent as to any claimed surprise 'vhile the trial "·as in 
session. At no time did plaintiff claim surprise due to 
said variance in testimony nor did plaintiff request any 
recess or continuance during the trial in order to check 
on and investigate the matters upon which plaintiff 
now claims surprise. Furthermore, the record sho,vs that 
Sheriff Stocks \Vas t~e first 'vitness called for the defense 
and testified on the second day of trial, 'vhich 'vas the 
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13th day of December, 1956, and the trial continued on 
December 14, 1956, and plaintiff had opportunity to check 
on the testimony of Sheriff Stocks and present rebutal 
testimony on December 14. If plaintiff was surprised by 
the testimony of Stocks he had ample opportunity to 
check the accuracy of the statements made by Sheriff 
Stocks while on the witness stand. 
Defendant Tibbetts was with defendant Stocks at all 
times in question on April 27, 1955, but plaintiff never 
took his deposition or exercised any rights of discovery 
to determine what Tibbetts knew about the matters in 
question and w.hat he would testify to. Insofar as the de-
fendant Tibbetts is concerned plaintiff clearly has no 
basis whatsoever for claiming surprise. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit that the Trial Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion 
for change of place of trial nor in denying plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial, and submit that the judgment of 
the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
FRANDSEN AND KELLER 
By: DuANE A. FRANDSEN 
Professional Building 
HARRY SNow, Moab, Utah 
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